A dynamic stochastic model of global equilibrium, where countries outside the US face higher risk than the US itself, predicts current account surpluses in the RoW and US deficits. With Loss Aversion, such precautionary savings can cause substantial 'global imbalances', particularly if there is an inefficient supply of global 'insurance'.
Introduction
Current forecasts of global growth may be benign, but they pose interesting puzzles.
If growth is expected to proceed at a healthy rate, why are real interest rates so low (Greenspan's conundrum)? If the current account US deficit proves unsustainable, how is it to adjust? Will this assisted by policy coordination 4 , as for the dollar in the 1980s: or can it be left to market forces? Before developing a simple global model to show how low real interest rates around the world and high savings outside the USA may be explained by attitudes towards risk, we outline some influential but contrasting views currently in circulation.
Bretton Woods 2; Charles River reactions; and Dark matter
To understand current events some argue that one needs to look back fifty years to the creation of the Bretton Woods system of fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates. Then, after WW II was over, the major economies of Europe pegged against the US dollar at exchange rates low enough to permit export-led recovery and a reconstitution of reserves. Now, in the 21 st century, it is not recovery from war but emergence from relative poverty that dictates the choice of regime; and the currency that is effectively pegged against the dollar is the Chinese remnimbi in what Dooley et al. ( 2004) call a revived Bretton Woods (hereafter BW2).
In their eyes, a policy of export-led growth, giving jobs to the millions who are leaving the land to seek jobs in manufacturing, makes good sense for China, now and for some time to come. And China is willing to hold the US securities that are financing the counterpart US deficits, a ready store of liquidity available to head off virulent financial panic of the type that swept East Asia in 1997/8. (If that was like bank run, as Jeff Sachs suggested at the time, China is now enabled to act as a regional lender-of-last-resort, and it is in fact party to regional swap arrangements to boost confidence, Kohlscheen and Taylor, 2006) .
Support for the viability of BW2 has been provided by Richard Cooper of Harvard
University, a close observer of the Chinese scene, who argues that the investing domestic savings in dollars makes good sense for a country plagued with insecurity of property rights. This view effectively attributes to the US an 'exorbitant privilege' akin to monopoly in the issue of money as a liquid store of value: so the US is exporting security of ownership in exchange for cheap manufactures of goods.
Cooper's view has been provided with intriguing theoretical underpinning in a recent paper whose first author is at nearby MIT. Caballero et al. (2006) specify an infinite horizon OLG model of global demand and supply, where one group of countries is restricted in its the ability to capitalise on future earnings. They show how this reduces the group's effective wealth in global capital markets, lowering world interest rates and redistributing consumption towards countries that are not so restricted.
Conditional on the existence of such capital market constraints, the constellation of low real rates and 'global imbalances' is an equilibrium phenomenon. The idea that agents whose budget constraints reflect current income rather than expected future flow will restrict their consumption accordingly sounds rather Keynesian; but, on their analysis, the restriction leads to lower interest rates not unemployment.
Rather than shackles that may hobble Asian economies, Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2005) appeal to the quasi-monopoly power of the US to explain the viability of the current regime 5 . The country may be running deficits as conventionally measured, but this is offset, they argue, by the acquisition of assets that are improperly accounted for. The missing elements, so-called dark matter, reflect quasi-rents in three areas: in the issuance of money in the form of dollar bills (seigniorage stricto sensu); in the provision of secure assets for a risky world; and in the supply of entrepreneurial know-how (adding 'goodwill' to US FDI).
The Transfer Problem; the Peso Problem; and the Risk of Recession
The sanguine view of a revived and relatively durable BW2 has been subjected to persistent and detailed criticism from academics, market watchers and think tanks, 5 An analysis that may find support in Meissner and Taylor (2006) . many located in the US itself. What then of those who see cracks in the edifice, signs of the demise of a regime created by peradventure and sustained by US deficits which would merit severe downgrades for any other sovereign borrower? Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) , for example, judge the pattern of global imbalances to be unsustainable. To calibrate the adjustments needed to correct for this they appeal to an earlier historical episode -the transfer of resources from Germany to the Allies after WWI. Since the US is absorbing more than it produces (pace Hausmann and Sturzenegger), this will have shifted the real exchange rate, with the terms of trade moving in favour of US exports and the price of non-traded goods in the US rising relative to foreign counterparts. As and when the US curbs its absorption, the real exchange rate must adjust to reflect the shift of global demand. This may require a thirty percent devaluation of the dollar (a weighted average of a 10% shift in the terms of trade and 40% shift in the relative price of non-traded goods, very approximately).
Their timely treatment is, however, subject to two criticisms. First, the model is static so it has little to say about the global interest rates. It is an account of general equilibrium in a global endowment economy, with intertemporal issues left to one side: the US deficit continues until, at some unspecified date, capital markets cry halt and the dollar falls to secure the appropriate reallocation of consumption. Second, in the process of adjustment it is assumed that national income constraints mimic those of a "transfer" problem; but it is far from clear why a unilateral decision by the US to reduce absorption will lead to expanded absorption elsewhere, especially if the trigger for the US adjustment is a Sudden Stop in capital flows to the world's largest economy.
Assuming that the end of BW2 will involve a significant dollar devaluation, this should surely have implications for the global pattern of interest rates. Indeed, as Jim
Hanson has pointed out 6 , it implies existence of a 'peso problem'. If people expect a 30% dollar devaluation at some random time, then US assets should offer a devaluation premium. A peso problem in emerging market economies pushes their interest rates above the US rate: in this case, however, it is the rest of the world that 6 As discussant at the conference on "Global Imbalances It is a matter of history that the transfers mandated by the victorious allies after WWI were followed not by smooth economic adjustment but by falling demand and, ultimately, by the Great Depression. This may well be the historical precedent that prompts the warnings of possible disaster made Barry Eichengreen an expert on the Gold Standard and its collapse. He and Yung Park of Seoul University forsee a Sudden Stop in the lending to the US leading to collapse in the dollar with rising interest rates to prevent overshooting (and an attendant collapse of asset prices, especially housing). In their view, rising rates and falling demand in the US will lead to deficient demand at a global level, (Eichengreen and Park, 2006) . introduces loss aversion leading to substantial precautionary saving and US deficit. In the absence of complete markets, substantial risk can lead to negative interest rates.
Section 5 discusses whether strategic factors may lead to the limitations of insurance markets. Section 6 discusses sustainability and the temporary nature of the precautionary savings. Section 7 considers the possible emergence of Keynesian equilibrium due to a Liquidity Trap and/or a 'Sudden Stop' in capital flows. Section 8 concludes that a savings glut could lead to deficient world demand if it is combined with financial panic that prevents the US from acting as "consumer of last resort". These can be illustrated simply using the Fisher diagram, Figure 1 .
External Imbalances and Irving Fisher
First let the endowment of the US be at point A and that of the rest of the world at A', the former exhibiting high growth and the latter no growth. Given identical tastes, admittedly something of a caricature as growth differentials are taken as exogenous).
7 As, in a full employment context, did Keynes and Ramsey (1928) .
Next assume by contrast that both countries have identical endowment at point A.
While the US consumes with the appropriate intertemporal budget constraint, let the RoW be constrained to lower budget line passing through A' as might be the case if capital markets fail to take due account of future endowments. The consumption and savings in period 1 will be precisely the same as for the case of growth differentials.
Could this represent the capital-constrained perspective of Caballero et al? (Probably not, because it would not be sensible for the RoW to save knowing that it is about to receive the same endowment as the US!) These inter-temporal accounts are essentially deterministic: would a stochastic specification have something more to offer? This is what we explore next, first with standard (logarithmic) preferences and then with the introduction of loss aversion.
A General Equilibrium approach
To incorporate risk, we use a simplified dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in the tradition of Mas-Colell et al (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) . This stylised one good model has two time periods, two states of nature and two countries; and we use the appellation Home country to denote the US and Foreign to denote the Rest of the World (RoW) treated as a bloc. The framework not much different from that used earlier in Miller et al (2005 Miller et al ( , 2006 to study global finance and the US New Economy, though the endowment pattern reflects the traditional situation where the US invests in risky assets and supplies safety and security in exchange (Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2005) .
Rather than postulating growth differentials, with low growth for the RoW accounting for low world real interest rates and large US deficits, we assume identical expected growth but differential risk. Specifically growth prospects in RoW have greater volatility than for the US. Though this does not have a great impact in a standard general equilibrium framework, results change when downside risk is aggravated by a form of Loss Aversion. (The utility of consumption in period 2 which lies below that reached in the previous period is sharply discounted.) In a stochastic environment, the resulting risk sensitivity can lead the RoW to acquire substantial insurance; and to act 'as if' it underestimates the mathematical expectation of growth.
When the relevant insurance is not be available (or the provision is not credible), the RoW can always 'self-insure' -saving instead of swapping financial promises. So the desire to limit downside risk can make the RoW act 'as if' it has very low time preference as we show in numerical outcomes below. Combining inadequate insurance with Loss Aversion provides a ready explanation for low interest rates, the US deficit and high RoW savings. If there is concern that consumption on the downside should not fall relative to past levels, China can of course seek insurance by selling FDI and buying US government bonds: and it can also seek to self-insure by acquiring US bonds via the current account. If, for any reason, the first option is limited, then self-insurance will be seen as the only way to avoid an unappealing prospect -the prospect, perhaps, of humiliation like that suffered by its near neighbour South Korea in 1997/1998 when it had to go cap in hand to the IMF and G7 and sacrifice sovereignty to get the financial support it needed in the crisis.
These considerations suggest that strategic factors may play a role that is not captured in the competitive framework we use here 9 : that some sort of insurance market game may be in process. This is discussed briefly in section 4 below.
Benchmark Case
The pattern of endowments assumed is indicated in Table 2 . Both blocs are endowed with one unit at time one. In expected terms each bloc grows at the rate g , say three percent. In the absence of uncertainty each bloc would consume its endowment and, with log utility, real interest rates would equal growth rate plus the pure rate of time preference. If the latter were, say, 1.5 percent, this would imply the global real interest rates of 4.5%.
With uncertainty, consider the case where future endowments for ROW can take one of two values: high and low, with a standard deviation of σ around the mean rate of growth. (For convenience, each of the two outcomes is treated equi-probable; and in simulationsσ varies between 3 to 12%.) USA ROW High (with probability π ) Low (with probability π Table 2 The pattern of endowments To understand the pattern of savings and world real interest rates, we first present benchmark results where the complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities can be traded.
Later we will look at how these results may change if the set of securities is restricted or preferences modified. For simple exposition of the benchmark results, we assume representative consumers in both countries share identical preferences. Home country's lifetime utility is given by
where β is time preference, 1 C and ) ( 2 ⋅ C are period 1 and period 2 consumption respectively. The budget constraint of the Home country is given by
) are Arrow prices measured in period 1 sure consumption, and W is the present value of Home country's total wealth.
Given Arrow prices, Home's optimal consumption implied by its first order conditions are simply
Those for the Foreign country follow the same forms.
Applying equilibrium conditions, that total consumption in each period and state equals the corresponding total endowment, determines the equilibrium Arrow prices and real interest rates as follows:
where superscript W indicates world endowment. The pattern of consumption is obtained by substituting (6) and (7) into (3), (4) and (5).
With the endowments specified in Table 2 , Foreign has an incentive to save in period 1. This is evident from a comparison of Foreign wealth relative to Home wealth. Note
where σ is the standard deviation of the Foreign endowment and
Because Foreign wealth is relatively lower, so is consumption, i.e.
. So Foreign would save and Home would run a current account deficit. Clearly the more volatile is Foreign's endowment is in period 2 (higher σ ) the higher will be its period 1 savings. But with log utility and efficient provision of 'insurance', the savings effects are distinctly modest, as will be seen in Table 3 .
How securities markets provide this insurance is indicated in Figure 2 , an Edgeworth box diagram as in Mas-Colell et al (p.593, 1995) , where for convenience we ignore the effect of the first period savings (which turn out to be very small, see Table 3 ).
Outcomes for the high payoff state are on the horizontal and for the low payoff state on the vertical, and utility for the RoW is measured from the lower left corner while that for US is measured from the upper right. Identical probability assessments and utility functions imply that the contract curve is the diagonal in the figure. How does aggregate risk affect global interest rates and current account imbalances?
Not very much, as is shown in Table 3 
Equilibrium with no "insurance"
What if the only asset traded between the two countries is a bond which has the same payoff in both states in period 2? In the absence of insurance possibilities, the RoW will save more in period 1 to avoid potential utility losses were it to consume its unequal endowments in period 2, and the extra savings will bring down the global rate of interest. This can be shown as follows.
Denote S the first period saving by the Home country (the amount of bonds purchased), its optimal level is determined by the solution to the following problem:
subject to
where ) 1 ( r + is the gross real interest rates. 
Equations (9) and (10) are used to generate numerical results in Table 4 . Table 4 . Savings and real interest rates without insurance.
The RoW saving as percentage of GDP (and the US deficit) is twice as large as in the benchmark case, but it still remains very small even when standard deviation of the shock to its endowment rises to 12%. The effect on interest rates is more pronounced they fall by 60 basis points, to less than 4%, as the standard deviation increases from 3 to 12%. So, with log utility, it appears that eliminating insurance does not predict a savings glut in the RoW.
Loss aversion, high savings and low global real interest rates

Loss aversion with a complete set of Arrow securities
In this section, we modify the preferences of the RoW by incorporating two elements from Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979): namely, reference dependence and loss aversion. We assume that consumption achieved in the previous period acts as a reference in the current period, so the measurement of utility depends on whether there is a "loss" or a "gain" in current consumption relative to this reference. To capture loss aversion, we assume that, close to the reference point, the increase in utility of a unit "gain" in current consumption (relative to the reference) is much smaller than the decrease in utility of a unit "loss" in current consumption.
Specifically, let the utility of state i consumption be defined as To make the following treatment tractable, we consider an extreme case of loss aversion, namely, +∞ → λ . Under this simplification, (11) is equivalent to constraints
The procedure used here, of imposing the constraint that next period's consumption in any state of the world should not fall below consumption in the current period, could also be viewed as an extreme form of habit formation as widely used in macroeconomic models. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) , in their attempts to determine whether sticky prices can lead to volatile and persistent real exchange rate movements, for example, assume in one experiment that the utility from consumption depends not on current consumption but its level relative to a fraction of last period's aggregate consumption. A similar formulation has also been used by Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) , Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and In what follows, we show that loss aversion can also increase savings, but only if consumption would otherwise have fallen below the reference trigger. With complete contingent securities, Home optimal consumption is derived in the same way as in Section 2.1. But Foreign's optimal consumptions are solutions to the following problem:
subject to the budget constraint
and (12).
How loss aversion in the Foreign country change the equilibrium prices and allocation? We summarise these results in the following propositions.
Proposition 1. If 2g
σ ≤ , equilibrium prices and allocation are the same as those in Section 2.1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that with complete Arrow securities, both countries can share risks. This risksharing means that both countries consume more or less equal proportions of the aggregate state endowment. So if the standard deviation of Foreign endowment in period 2 is small, the Foreign country is effectively insured against low consumption in the bad state. Therefore, no additional saving is required.
Proposition 2. For the endowment structure given in Table 2 , if 2g ) and to make it more forward-looking (
).
The quantitative significance of such loss aversion on real interest rates and savings are given in the Table below. With the standard deviation of up to 6%, the constraint is not binding, so the real interest rates and savings are the same as in Table 3 . But the effect of loss aversion becomes apparent when the standard deviation increases to 12% or 18%: this generates a substantial increase in the RoW savings and a marked fall in the global interest rates. As a consequence US deficit can rise by more than 2%
of GDP as a 3% fall of the real interest rates encourage US consumption. Table 5 . Savings and real interest rates under loss aversion.
To see how loss aversion can impact on global equilibrium, we redraw the Edgeworth box used earlier to show the general equilibrium outcomes and how they may be replicated by lower time preference (higher β ) and greater pessimism (lower π ). 
Loss aversion with no insurance
Results from the section above show how loss aversion can significantly increase savings and reduce world interest rate. This is the case even if both countries can (1)
and the consumption allocation for the Home country can be obtained simply by using the market clearing conditions. (2) C C ≥ . Imposing binding constraint yields the optimal consumption for the Foreign country as in (15) and (16). The optimal consumption for the Home country, derived in the same way as in Section 3.2, gives One thing worth noting from the above proposition is that the bond-only case generates a binding constraint * * 2 1
(2) C C = for a smaller σ compared with the case where Arrow securities can be traded. This is because that the removal of statecontingent securities can make it impossible for the Foreign country to insure against low consumption in the low state in the second period. So loss aversion means that the Foreign country has to increase savings even for a moderate σ .
To understand how the general equilibrium outcomes are determined in this bondonly case where the constraint * * 2 1
(2) C C ≥ binds, we use the following two diagrams. As σ increases (so point B moves downwards), the RoW savings will go up. The relationship between the US current account deficit and the real interest rates is illustrated in Figure 5 where horizontal axis represent US endowment and consumption in period one, and the vertical those in period two. Point A describes the US endowments, and the hyperbola AF represents US offer curve. 11 The intersection of the US budget constraint AC and the offer curve AF determines the optimal 11 The parametric representations of the US offer curve is given by the US intertemporal budget constraint and the proportionality condition, 2 1 / (1 ) C C r β = + , implied by its first order conditions. Replacing the real interest rates in one of the equations using the other gives the US offer curve. Proposition 5. Given the endowment structure specified in Table 2, Table 6 . Savings and real interest rates with loss aversion and no insurance.
As shown in the last column of The second to last column of Table 6 shows how the real interest rates fall when risk increases. For σ σ σ σ=12%, real interest rate becomes negative. The relationship between real interest rates and risk is illustrated in more detail in Figure 7 where the horizontal axis measures the standard deviation of Foreign period 2 endowment and the equilibrium real interest rates is plotted on the vertical axis. When the loss aversion constraint is not binding real interest rates decreases very slowly with increasing σ; but when the loss aversion constraint is binding the real interest rates fall sharply as risk increases. From Proposition 5, the critical level of σ beyond which the real interest turns negative turns out to be about 7.5% for the parameters used here. the effect of the interest rate is ignored. This is to be compared with savings rate when there is no insurance, which is approximately (σ/4 -g/2) = 0.045, i.e. three times as great. In the next section, we discuss the idea that the supply of insurance may be subject to strategic restriction.
Strategic considerations
Calculations reported above all assume competitive equilibrium even when the set of assets is incomplete. But, as Dooley and Garber (2005) 
Sustainability: a comparison
It may be interesting to compare what we get from a general equilibrium approach with results reported in a recent IMF study of the optimal reserves by Jeanne and Ranciere (2005) . For an emerging market economy facing a low spread in capital markets, the risk of a 10% fall in output should, according to Table 3 of their paper, lead to reserve holdings of 9.37% of GDP. For a country facing a high spread, however, optimal level of reserves falls to only 1.5% of GDP. Note that, as all these reserves will are used to smooth consumption if there is a shock and they are all reconstituted one period later, it is as if such a shock is associated with a corresponding savings rate lying between one and a half and nine and a half percent of GDP over the period of reserve build up. As there is no insurance in their model, this is to be compared with our bonds-only results, where the build-up of reserve 13 Supplying dollars at high prices as the RoW accumulates reserves, with a dollar devaluation when reserve stock reaches equilibrium, see Section 7.2 below.
assets precedes the crisis. For a shock with a downside of 12% our figure for savings is about four and a half percent, which is mid-way between the high (of about nine and a half) and the low (of about one and a half) for Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) : so it appears the results are broadly comparable.
Two observations may be made ---over the period of time that reserves are built up, and over the implications for sustainability. 
A 'Sudden Stop'?
Given robust expectations of growth, current real interest rates are surprisingly low; but the world is not in a liquidity trap. Nevertheless, the pattern of global imbalances has given economists cause for concern. Does the global model sustain such concern or not? First, we conclude that a pattern of global imbalances where high savings in the RoW is matched by corresponding US deficits is essentially a transitional phenomenon. So some adjustment will have to come.
When reserve positions are adequate, there will be no need for additional precautionary saving, and RoW should consume more and the US less. In addition, however, relative prices may need to adjust. This is spelled out in detail in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) , for example, who argue that the price of US non-traded goods will have to fall sharply relative to RoW nontraded goods, and the relative price of US traded goods will also have to fall. Given the objective of keeping the aggregate price indices constant in each block, they calculate that this translates into a decline of about 30% in the dollar. In their view, moreover, the perception that the situation is not sustainable and that adjustment requires a fall in the dollar leaves the US vulnerable to a Sudden Stop in capital flows. A precautionary savings glut appears to us to be a temporary phenomenon, destined for correction as and when adequate reserve levels are achieved. In a realistic setting with differentiated traded and non-traded goods, this correction will also require a substantial change in relative prices. So expectations of adjustment may lead to a pre- 
